U.S.S. AUGUSTA

File no. CA31/
Care Postmaster, New York, N.Y

S E C R E T

From:      The Commanding Officer
To:        The Commander in Chief, US Fleet
Via:       The Commander Task Force 34

Subject:   Action Report - U.S.S. AUGUSTA - Casablanca - Fedala Area,
           French Morocco, 8-10 November, 1942 

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U.S.S. AUGUSTA

File no. CA31/
Care Postmaster, New York, N.Y

S E C R E T

4. RADAR

A. Approach to Fedala

Radar landfall made bearing 115 degrees range 117 miles at approximately 0930 November 7. Indications faded and reappeared at irregular intervals.

Commencing at 2117 November 7, the construction was begun of geographic land plot from radar information. From an arbitrary reference point on tracing paper, the ship's DR position was plotted to the scale of an approach chart. CXAM-1 and SG radar radar ranges and bearings on nearest land on various bearings, and of prominent radar landmarks, were plotted as obtained from the DR position. By 2221 a sufficient amount of data was plotted to permit superposition of the tracing on the chart. This placed the ship as bearing 010 degrees range 32,300 yards from Cap Fedala. This position further checked with matching an appropriately-scaled transparent photograph of the approach chart against the SG radar Plan Position Indicator (PPI).

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U.S.S. AUGUSTA

File no. CA31/
Care Postmaster, New York, N.Y

S E C R E T

	B. Night Submarine Attack of November 11, 1942

General Quarters following torpedoing of ships at anchorage. SG picked up target later identified as a surfaced submarine bearing 318 range 9,000 yards. Target could be identified as being definitely smaller than a destroyer and probably larger than a landing boat. Submarine opened to 9,420 yards and closed to 8,630. Two destroyers were then observed on the screen closing on contact from East and South. Destroyer closing from East passed over location where contact abruptly disappeared when DD was 1,300 yards away.

	C. Radar Material.

Urgent consideration is recommended toward improving resistance to gunshock of all radar equipments. SG radar relays chattered during firing and impaired operation at some of the most crucial moments. One SG high voltage rectifier tube was thrown out of its socket due to inadequate mounting. Door interlock chattered and opened time delay relay, rendering equipment inoperative for 60 second period of relay. Two fuses mounted inside train and indicator unit had their excessively small filaments broken, and had to be replaced by heavy fuses. Both panel fuses on the train and indicator unit caused some loss of operation due to burning of contact surfaces of fuse clips and fuses during gunshock. Surfaces had to be scraped and cleaned away every two to four hours during action. It is pointed out that action lasted three days, and all of the above-mentioned casualties contributed to a number of short periods of loss of operation. The schematic wiring diagrams included in the instruction book are considered extremely unsatisfactory due to poor arrangement of drawings and lack of indication of external circuits. Schematic wiring leads are difficult to trace due to many angles, crossings and long runs. Circuits that go to other units must be traced through two other diagrams, whereas the external circuits could be simply indicated on each diagram. Values of component parts must be looked up in separate tables. Valuable time was wasted during the action due to these poor schematic diagrams. The diagrams of ENG 115 (FC and FD instruction book) would serve as a good guide for revision of SG schematic diagrams.

The after FC and FD fire control radars had casualties due to gunshock in the Regulated Rectifier units and in the Control Amplifier for the FC antenna training system. All 274B and 2A3 tubes were thrown out of sockets of FC aft regulated rectifier, and about half of them were broken. All 2A3 tubes except one were similarly thrown out of

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U.S.S. AUGUSTA

File no. CA31/
Care Postmaster, New York, N.Y

S E C R E T

sockets in the FD aft regulated rectifier. The FD aft continued to operate satisfactorily, however. The FC aft control amplifier was thrown clear of its mounting, its sockets were broken, metal tubes crushed, and wires torn loose. The drive motor in the antenna pedestal was knocked out of its mounting. This is a standard SC pedestal, in which the drive motor is suspended from a flange mounting at the upper end. Apparently additional bracing is required toward the lower end of the motor to prevent it from whipping about the present end mounting. The motor was secured in place with wood blocks, the control amplifier repaired, tubes replaced in the regulated rectifier, and equipment left in normal operating condition. It is recommended that devices be installed to secure 274B and 2A3 tubes in sockets, and that units should not be mounted on light outboard bulkheads where shock is severe.

The forward FC and FD equipments operated satisfactorily throughout the action. The forward FD is equipped with an LW test equipment, from which very satisfactory performance has been obtained. An additional test lead is desirable to permit its application to the forward FC, and another LW with leads for FC aft and FD aft is desirable in the sail locker aft.

CXAM-1 equipment had 14 type 100th tubes fall due to gunshock. At the end of the action only two spares remained. A little trouble was experienced from interlocks chattering open occasionally. In general, however, very good operation was obtained from the CXAM-1.

D. Joint Army-Navy Radar Warning Net.

Upon occupation of Casablanca, a joint Army-Navy radar warning net was established. The Army had no available radar equipments for several days after the occupation, and all of their long range equipments had been lost due to torpedoings at Fedala. Voice radio communication was established between AUGUSTA and the flying field where Army fighter aircraft were based. All aircraft not identified by IFF were reported by Purple Grid coordinates to the Army. Such contacts as could not be identified by flight schedule or IFF were investigated by fighter aircraft.

Later, Army short range radars were placed in operation which reported on the same voice circuit. Advantageous cooperation was possible in making identifications, as it frequently developed that one radar could detect IFF on a contact reported as identified by another. The need of authenticators for this type of communication

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U.S.S. AUGUSTA

File no. CA31/
Care Postmaster, New York, N.Y

S E C R E T

is apparent. It was observed that the CXAM-1 was getting about double the range of the small Army radars. There was no opportunity to check against the performance of Army long range radars, as none were available prior to departure from Casablanca. The ARKANSAS assumed the joint radar guard upon departure of the AUGUSTA. It was observed that her SC had approximately half the range of the AUGUSTA CXAM-1.

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